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ABSTRACT
The constitutional protection of private property is rooted in the notion that individual rights ought to be insulated
from the tyranny of the majority. However, as interest group theory teaches us, democratic decision-making suffers
from another systemic failure that is no less pernicious, no less ubiquitous, but less transparent: interest groups are
capable of steering government to favor their narrow interests at the expense of diffuse citizens and the broad public
interest. In this Article we argue that this ‘capture’ characteristically results in anticompetitive regulatory measures
that inflate the prices of products and services above their competitive market price or reduce their quality. Such
measures transfer wealth from the many to the few, as they diminish the value of diffuse citizens’ disposable income
in terms of purchasing power. We propose to conceive of this loss as a potentially unconstitutional taking of the
diffuse citizens’ property. Our account challenges the Madisonian assumption, embedded in the Constitution, that
constitutions must protect the property rights of the propertied minority against the tyranny of the deprived majority.
We argue that the Constitution must also limit another type of taking, effected when a minority solicits
anticompetitive government measures that diminish the value of the disposable income of the marginalized majority.
Accordingly, anticompetitive regulation catering to special interests will be deemed prima facie unconstitutional
unless it is necessary to promote public purposes.
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INTRODUCTION
The constitutional protection of private property is rooted in the notion
that individual rights and liberties ought to be protected against the tyranny
of the majority. James Madison, who viewed the protection of property as a
key object of republican government,1 was ostensibly guided by a concern
that majoritarian rule will systematically fail to protect the interests of the
propertied minority. Madison cautioned that, while questions of public
policy must be determined by the will of the majority, the “majority may
trespass on the rights of the minority,”2 and stressed that “[i]n all cases where
a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the rights of the
minority are in danger.”3
However, studies in interest group theory4 teach us that the democratic
political process suffers from another systemic weakness which may be no
less pernicious, no less ubiquitous, but less transparent than the majoritarian
failure that Madison had anticipated. As interest group theory has exposed,
the diffuse public is limited in its capacity to affect public decisions through
the public political process, while concentrated interest groups possess an
unequaled ability to ‘capture’ lawmakers and regulators and steer them to
shape public policy that favors narrow special interests at the expense of the
broad public interest.5 Therefore, contrary to Madison’s view, in the
ubiquitous cases where a minority is united by a common interest or passion,
the rights of the majority are likely to be in danger.

1
2

3
4

5

JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 16 (1990).
JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785),
reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES
MADISON 7, 9–10 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1973).
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 135 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
Interest group theory “seeks to explain governmental behavior on the basis of the costs of organizing
interest groups in order to seek wealth transfers through the aegis of the state.” Robert B. Ekelund
& Robert D. Tollison, The Interest-Group Theory of Government, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO PUBLIC
CHOICE ch.17 (William F. Shughart II & Laura Razzolini eds., 2001).
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 7 (1965).
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The takings jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court is aligned with the
spirit of Madison’s counter-majoritarian conception of constitutional
property rights, focusing on the taking of private property of one or a few
owners for the pursuit of a public interest.6 The Court has long held that the
purpose of the Takings Clause is “to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole.”7 Considering the lessons of interest group
theory, this Article argues that the constitutional protection of private
property should sometimes serve the opposite purpose—namely, to bar
government from unjustly imposing economic injuries on the public in the
pursuit of special interests.
This contention, if correct, should lead us to reexamine what kinds of
private interests ought to be conceptualized as amounting to constitutionally
protected property rights, and when and how government measures
imposing burdens on those rights ought to pass judicial muster for their
constitutionality. The Article proposes such a reconceptualization, arguing
that anticompetitive government measures that are motivated by special
interests’ capture should be conceptualized as potentially unconstitutional
takings of diffuse citizens’ private property.8 Such measures tend to result in
massive transfers of wealth from the many to the few, allowing interest groups
to reap increased profits while diminishing the disposable income of the
diffuse majority, in terms of its purchasing power (i.e., the quantity and
quality of products and services that can be purchased with a unit of
currency). The Article suggests that the value of disposable income, in terms
of purchasing power, must be conceived as constitutionally protected
property, and that anticompetitive government measures that diminish it to
the benefit of special interests should be conceptualized as effecting its
unconstitutional taking if they are not justified as necessary to promote a
public purpose. Furthermore, it suggests that such a conceptualization
should give rise to judicial review that could effectively preempt the adverse
influences of special interest groups on government.

6
7

8

See, e.g., City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 842 (Cal. 1982) (in bank) (discussing
the use of eminent domain to take property for the general benefit of the public).
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed
the ‘Armstrong principle’ since the case was decided. William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong
Principle, the Narratives of Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151, 1153–54
(1997).
For examples of such anticompetitive government measures, see infra notes 18–29 and
accompanying text.
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Other scholars have suggested that interest group theory justifies and
makes desirable rigorous judicial review. Among others, Erwin Chemerinsky
suggested that the executive and legislative branches’ proneness to capture
warrants rigorous judicial review,9 and Cass Sunstein argued that the courts
should invalidate legislation that benefits certain groups resulting solely from
their exercise of raw political power.10 The novelty in this approach is that
the Article, for the first time, gives a name to a specific type of ubiquitous, if
inconspicuous, type of government-imposed wealth transfer that caters to
special interests at the expense of the diffuse public, thus bringing it under
the framework of the constitutional protection of private property and
thereby justifying rigorous judicial scrutiny of its manifestations. The
conception of individuals belonging to the diffuse public as bearers of rights,
protecting them against the taking of their private property by
anticompetitive regulation, provides these individuals with standing to
demand judicial review, a mechanism that could assist them in overcoming
the debilitating collective action problem that they face.
This innovation adds constitutional underpinnings to those antitrust
scholars who suggested applying federal antitrust law to anticompetitive
government measures.11 However, we believe that constitutional law is the
appropriate framework to address such measures as they pertain to the
systemic failures of the democratic process. Constitutional protection is
required to limit the discretion of legislators who define the scope of antitrust
law as they actively seek to attract special interests.

9
10

11

Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 44, 46–47, 78, 80–81
(1989).
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 69 (1985); Cass R.
Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1693 (1984). On the need
for rigorous judicial review in light of interest-group capture, see also BERNARD H. SIEGAN,
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 281–82 (1980) (noting the disproportionate
power of statutes that consider special interests over general public concerns); Jerry L. Mashaw,
Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL. L. REV. 849, 874–75 (1980)
(noting the likely failure of legislative bodies to successfully combat interest-group capture). See
generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985) (laying out the conflict between public and private law as it relates to the expansion
of state power and original constitutional construction).
See, e.g., John Sherpard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 747
(1986) (“Just as state and local regulations protected by federal antitrust exemption should escape
preemption, so state and local regulations logically remain vulnerable to preemption if they
implicate but extend further than the subject of a federal antitrust exemption.”); see also William H.
Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exception
After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1137 (1981) (“[T]he Court should recognize
antitrust failure as a plausible basis for permissive regulation.”).
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The Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the problem of
anticompetitive government measures designed to favor special interest
groups at the expense of the diffuse public. Part II provides the justification
for conceptualizing anticompetitive government measures as potentially
unconstitutional takings of diffuse citizen’s property: Section A establishes
that such measures could be seen as government-imposed transfers of wealth
which diminish the property of the diffuse public; and Section B argues that,
in contrast with other conceivable types of government-imposed wealth
transfers, anticompetitive government measures are worthy of rigorous
judicial scrutiny, as the vulnerability of diffuse citizens to the systemic failures
of the political process merits constitutional protection of their property
interests. This justification is based on the contention that the constitutional
protection of private property is designed to protect owners against purely
private wealth transfers caused by the systemic failures of the democratic
process. The Article argues that this contention is supported by the original
understanding of the constitutional protection of private property, which was
guided by the Framers’ concerns about a political majority abusing its power
against the propertied minority. Part III will propose and discuss a
framework for constitutional protection of the diffuse public’s property as
well as the appropriate tests for judicial review of anticompetitive
government measures. The Article then suggests that such measures should
be invalidated if they result from special-interest influence and are not
necessary to promote their purported public purpose. The Article then
concludes.
I. INTEREST GROUP THEORY AND ANTICOMPETITIVE GOVERNMENT
MEASURES
Economic regulation is inescapably involved in allocating and
reallocating burdens and entitlements across society. Some allocative effects
are caused by direct physical interference with economic interests, such as
the physical taking of private land for public use, while others are caused by
indirect interference with economic interests through regulation and macroeconomic policy. Low exchange rates may serve the interests of exporters at
the expense of importers; decreasing the corporate tax rate may serve the
interests of businesses while harming the interests of those favored by
extensive public services; some regulations may serve broad public interests
in health and safety while imposing high compliance costs on businesses; and
some regulations may limit commercial competition placing increased costs
on consumers.
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Under a traditional account of government regulation, such allocative
effects are the product of policy choices aimed at pursuing public interests
determined by the democratic political process and public-spirited
lawmakers and state executives. However, while this account may serve as a
fair normative theory of how government ought to function, studies in
interest group theory suggest that it fails as a positive account of the actual
behavior of lawmakers and state executives. Under the public choice
account of regulation, policymakers are seen as self-interested agents that are
often incentivized to be more responsive to narrow special-interest groups
than to the broad public. As George Stigler suggested, that is because groups
that stand to win or lose the most from government action are incentivized
to make the greatest effort to ‘capture’ policymakers and regulators in order
to ensure that regulation serves their narrow interests.12
Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action13 provided the explanation for
why Stigler’s findings could be generalized: smaller groups are more likely to
succeed at shaping favorable public policies by capturing policymakers, at
the expense of the larger groups that try to shape policy through the political
system.14 Olson demonstrated that the problem of collective action arises
when large groups attempt to produce a public good that will be accessible
to all of its members. That is because individual members of the group, being
rational and intent on pursuing their self-interest, will seek to enjoy the fruits
of the joint enterprise at the lowest possible investment of their own personal
resources. The larger and more homogenous the group is, the less its
members are incentivized to contribute to the joint enterprise, as they are
aware that if other members succeed in bringing about the desired result,
they would be able to reap the benefits while avoiding the costs. In contrast,
when a concentrated interest group attempts to promote a shared interest
12

13
14

George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (arguing
that regulation often reflects the interests of the regulated who control the regulatory process). See
generally MARVER BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
(Greenwood Press 1977) (1955) (providing an early account of the tendency of administrative
agencies to protect the industries they regulate and define the public interest according to the
interest of the regulated); GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A
REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1900–1916 (1963) (arguing that the progressive
federal regulations of the early twentieth century, purportedly aimed to serve the public interest,
were in fact designed to favor business interests).
OLSON, supra note 5.
See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982) (using game theory to elaborate on the
likelihood of overcoming prisoners’ dilemma situations); MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF
COOPERATION (1987) (same); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. &
ECON. 211 (1976) (generalizing Stigler’s theory of regulation and establishing diminishing returns
to group size in using the political process to obtain wealth transfers).
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that would produce benefits accessible only to its members, it will succeed in
overcoming the collective action problem. Individual members of the group
would be sufficiently incentivized to invest resources in the joint enterprise,
as the reward would be more valuable per capita, and the small size of the
group would reduce the costs of monitoring and imposing sanctions on
members who do not contribute to the effort.
Members of the diffuse public face a collective action problem when they
seek to shape public policies or merely to obtain information on public
decisions affecting their interests.15 Because members of the broad public
make up a large and diffuse group, they have a low per capita incentive to
invest resources in collecting information on public decisions, and much less
so to invest time in active participation in the public political process. As
Anthony Downs observed, the resulting information gaps between voters and
representatives is the primary problem in representative democracy.16
Generally speaking, diffuse voters are not familiar with the processes of
public decision-making and with particular decisions affecting their interests,
nor are they capable of assessing the reasons and justifications behind
particular decisions. At the same time, concentrated interest groups are
uniquely capable of overcoming the same collective action problem, due to
their small size and particular interests. They can thus take advantage of the
information gaps between the broad public and its representatives,
exacerbate those gaps by influencing the media, and effectively invest
resources in lobbying, campaign finance, or other forms of support or
retaliation that may impel decision-makers to sway public decisions in their
favor.17
By capturing public decision-makers, interest groups regularly shape
regulations and macro-economic policies that restrain existing or potential
competition. They can steer policymakers to impose restrictions on
international or interstate trade,18 establish licensing regimes or other rules

15

16
17

18

Susanne Lohmann, An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 809,
811–12 (1998) (“[S]pecial interests prevail because they are better able to monitor the incumbent's
activities than are diffuse interests.”).
ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 247 (1957).
This understanding was further developed by Elinor Ostrom, who identified actors that collectively
have exclusive access to certain “common pool resources” as having a strong incentive to cooperate
in managing those resources. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
A large body of political economy literature explains restrictions on international trade by reference
to the demands of domestic interest groups seeking protection. See, e.g., Sean D. Ehrlich, The Tariff
and the Lobbyist: Political Institutions, Interest Group Politics, and U.S. Trade Policy, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 427,
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that limit or impose high market-entry costs,19 limit the quantity of output or
set the prices of certain goods,20 enact rules that allow competitors to
coordinate prices,21 or enact legislation exempting certain industries from
antitrust laws.22 Such measures artificially increase the market power of
interest groups and allow them to engage in monopolistic behavior, charging
supra-competitive prices or reducing the quality of the goods and services
that they produce or trade. These, in turn, result in massive transfers of
wealth from the many to the few, by increasing profits for the favored interest
groups and reducing the value of the disposable income of diffuse citizens in
terms of purchasing power.
Cases of public restraints of competition influenced by special interests
are very common and well documented: Gabriel Kolko argued in 1963 that
federal regulation between 1900–1916, which was commonly seen as
pursuing public progressive interests, was to a great extent influenced by
business interests in curbing competition;23 a study by Ralph Nader
published in 1973 found extensive anticompetitive effects of federal
regulation in the fields of communication, energy, transportation, and
others;24 in his seminal work describing the economic theory of regulation,
George Stigler exposed the ways in which the interest group of railroad
companies used state authority to preempt competition from truck drivers in
the early 1930s;25 in 1980, Congress passed legislation authorizing certain
vertical restraints on competition in the soft drink industry, influenced by soft
drink bottlers such as Coca-Cola and PepsiCo who sought immunity from
antitrust law in response to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) litigation

19
20

21
22
23
24
25

427–445 (2008) (linking shifts in U.S. trade policy to institutional change that decreased interest
group access to decision makers).
See generally Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1, 35 (2002).
For example, at issue in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), was a California state law designed to
establish artificially high market prices for California raisin growers by permitting them to fix prices
and restrict output. See Roger C. Simmons & John R. Fornaciari, State Regulation as an Antitrust
Defense: An Analysis of the Parker v. Brown Doctrine, 43 U. Cin. L. Rev. 61, 62–63 (1974).
For example, a California statute authorized price-setting by wine producers and wholesalers. See
Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
For example, in 1980, Congress passed legislation exempting anticompetitive practices in the softdrink industry from antitrust law in response to the demands of soft-drink firms. See infra note 26.
KOLKO, supra note 12, at 2–3.
THE MONOPOLY MAKERS: RALPH NADER’S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON REGULATION AND
COMPETITION 35, 103, 193, 227, 319 (Mark J. Green ed., 1973).
Stigler, supra note 12, at 8.
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against them;26 in the early 2000s, auto dealers succeeded in restraining
competition by attaining legislation in all fifty states prohibiting direct vehicle
sales by manufacturers and online sellers without a franchise presence,27 and
real estate brokers successfully lobbied for state laws and regulations
restricting price competition by barring real estate professionals from offering
limited brokerage services for lower fees instead of full package services;28 in
2003, the pharmaceutical industry invested $116 million in convincing
Congress to ban Medicare from negotiating for lower drug prices, resulting
in an estimated transfer of $90 billion per year from consumers to the
pharmaceutical industry.29 To be sure, these are only a few representative
examples.
Extant law exacerbates the problem of anticompetitive government
measures because it immunizes public competition restraints, and private
parties acting in accordance with them, from antitrust law, leaving no legal
tools at the hands of consumers or competitors that could be used to
challenge measures detrimental to their interests. Several Supreme Court
decisions have affirmed that federal regulations prevail when conflicting with
antitrust law,30 and the antitrust “state action doctrine,” first established in
the 1943 case of Parker v. Brown,31 holds that the Sherman Act does not apply
to competition restraints produced by official state action, provided that they
are part of a ‘clearly articulated’ state policy and are actively supervised by
the state.32 The Parker doctrine is based on principles of state sovereignty and
federalism: in the Parker decision, the Court found there is “nothing in the
language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose
was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its

26

27

28

29
30
31
32

SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, A.B.A., MONOGRAPH 24, FEDERAL STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS
FROM ANTITRUST LAW 49–50 (2007); Leonard R. Stein, Note, The Soft Drink Interbrand Competition
Act of 1980: Antitrust Loses Its Fizz, 18 HARV. J. LEGIS. 91, 91–92 (1981).
Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Fordham Annual Conference
on International Antitrust Law & Policy: State Intervention/State Action—a U.S. Perspective (Oct.
24, 2003).
Letter from Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, & R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant
Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Matt Blunt, Governor, State of Mo. (May 23,
2005); Letter from Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, & R. Hewitt Pate,
Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Loretta R. DeHay, Gen. Counsel,
Tex. Real Estate Comm’n (Apr. 20, 2005).
TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 56 (2018).
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 276 (2007); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 412 (2004).
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943).
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
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legislature”;33 in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., the Court
reasoned that “[t]he rationale of Parker was that, in light of our national
commitment to federalism, the general language of the Sherman Act should
not be interpreted to prohibit anticompetitive actions by the States in their
governmental capacities as sovereign regulators.”34
Besides the Parker doctrine, the corollary Noerr-Pennington35 doctrine holds
that “the federal antitrust laws also do not regulate the conduct of private
individuals in seeking anticompetitive action from the government.”36 The
doctrine, based on the premise that antitrust laws may not impinge upon
First Amendment rights to petition government, exempts private parties
from antitrust liability even if they seek anticompetitive government
measures with anticompetitive intent or by wrongful conduct.37
The immunity government measures could confer upon interest groups
wishing to engage in anticompetitive practices makes such measures all the
more valuable for interest groups and increases their incentive to influence
government. Former Chairman of the FTC, Timothy Muris, stated:
Protecting competition by focusing solely on private restraints is like trying
to stop the water flow at a fork in a stream by blocking only one channel. A
system that sends private price fixers to jail, but makes government
regulation to fix prices legal, has not completely addressed the competitive
problem. It has simply dictated the form that the problem will take. 38

Interestingly, the Parker and Noerr-Pennington doctrines could help
demonstrate why federal antitrust law is ill fitted to address the problem of
anticompetitive government measures, not just as a matter of law, but also as
a matter of legal theory. As the Supreme Court once stated, “Parker and Noerr
are complementary expressions of the principle that the antitrust laws
regulate business, not politics.”39 Indeed, rather than antitrust laws,
anticompetitive government measures aimed to favor interest groups ought
to be addressed by constitutional law, a body of law precisely intended to
33
34
35
36
37

38
39

Parker, 317 U.S. at 350–51.
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 374 (1991).
United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); E.R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961).
Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. at 379–80.
Bayou Fleet, Inc. v. Alexander, 234 F.3d 852, 859 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Noerr-Pennington immunity
applies to any concerted effort to sway public officials regardless of the private citizen’s
intent.”); Armstrong Surgical Ctr., Inc. v. Armstrong Cty. Memorial Hosp., 185 F.3d 154, 162 (3rd
Cir. 1999) (stating that the remedy for bribery, fraud, or deceit lies with laws that forbid such
conduct, and cannot be premised on willingness of courts to look behind state action in context of
antitrust litigation).
Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 170 (2005).
Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. at 383.
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regulate politics. The addressed problem raises essentially constitutional
questions concerning the failures of the political decision-making process and
the normative constraints on the legitimate use of government power to
transfer wealth between groups and individuals.
The issue at hand is constitutional in another important sense. As Tim
Wu argues in his recent book, antitrust law plays a “constitutional” role as it
was originally aimed to achieve a political goal alongside its economic goal.
According to Wu, antitrust was serving as “a check on private power, by
preventing the growth of monopoly corporations into something that might
transcend the power of elected government to control.”40 Wu turns our
attention to the fact that the collective action problem, allowing concentrated
interest groups to dominate the diffuse public in obtaining favorable public
policy in the first place, is made worse by restraints on competition: as
industries become more concentrated they can overcome their collective
action problem more easily as fewer players can benefit from reduced
coordination costs and increased benefits from the spoils of the desired
political outcome.41 Interest groups could thus use their disproportionate
political power to restrain competition, which in turn further increases their
political power, in a vicious cycle that corrupts the political process and
perpetuates the control of private power over public policy.
In what follows, this Article proposes a response to this problem. It argues
that such ‘captured’ government measures should be reconceptualized as
potentially unconstitutional takings of diffuse citizens’ private property if they
are not justified as necessary to accomplish their purported public purposes.
II. CONCEPTUALIZING ANTICOMPETITIVE GOVERNMENT MEASURES AS
POTENTIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
At the outset, the proposition that anticompetitive government measures
can be conceptualized as potentially unconstitutional takings of citizens’
private property may seem questionable. We are accustomed to regard
constitutional rights as counter-majoritarian constraints on government
action, shielding individuals and minorities, and not the broad public, from
unjust burdens. At the same time, we tend to view economic competition as
the subject of antitrust law that is designed to ensure aggregate economic

40
41

WU, supra note 29, at 54 (italics omitted).
Id. at 58.
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efficiency and aggregate consumer welfare rather than the protection of
individual rights.42
However, this Part argues that anticompetitive government measures
could and should be conceptualized as potentially unconstitutional takings of
citizens’ private property. This justification is based on the contention that
the constitutional protection of private property is designed to protect owners
against purely private wealth transfers caused by the systemic failures of the
democratic process. Section A establishes that anticompetitive government
measures designed to favor special-interest groups could be seen as
government-imposed transfers of wealth that enrich interest groups while
diminishing the property of the diffuse majority. Section B then explains
that, in contrast with other conceivable types of government-imposed wealth
transfers, anticompetitive government measures that transfer wealth from
the many to the few by exploiting the political vulnerability of diffuse citizens
are worthy of rigorous constitutional scrutiny. Support for this argument
could also be found in the vision of the Framers of the Constitution, whose
concerns with the failures of the political process led them to delineate the
types of private property interests that the Takings Clause should protect.
A. Anticompetitive Government Measures as Wealth Transfers that Diminish the
Property of the Diffuse Majority
Government restraints on competition often result in above-market
prices or below-market quality of affected goods or services. Subsequent to
such measures, the diffuse group of consumers will experience a diminution
of the value of their disposable income in terms of purchasing power—their
earnings will now allow them to purchase less in quantity or quality of the
same goods or services they could access before the measures. At the same
time, the interest groups favored by anticompetitive measures will reap
monopoly profits at the expense of their consumers. This Section aims to
establish that it is possible to conceive of such effects as government-imposed
wealth transfers that diminish the property of diffuse citizens.

42

Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress,
62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1020 (1987). But see Robert H. Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis
of the Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2349, 2354 (2013) (offering a different view that conceives of the Sherman Act as protecting
consumers’ property rights).
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This contention raises a conceptual problem. The distributive effect
described above is not generated by a government action that directly
expropriates wealth from diffuse citizens and allocates it to interest groups,
but rather by the indirect modification of market prices. Since competitive
market prices are determined by transactions between willing buyers and
sellers in voluntary market transactions, these prices may be viewed as
external to the property rights of the parties. While it is true that the currency
held by the diffuse citizens is indeed their private property, it would be
problematic to suggest that this property right includes an entitlement to
exchange some particular amount of their currency in return for a given
good. From this perspective, anticompetitive government measures cannot
be seen as diminishing private property, and they can hardly be seen as
government-imposed wealth transfers, since their distributive effects reflect
nothing more than the terms of voluntary transactions between private
parties.43
However, the notion that market prices are determined by willing buyers
and sellers alone serves to obscure the role played by government in affecting
prices by defining and enforcing property rights and regulating market
activity. Such government actions are involved in determining market prices
either by setting them directly or by modifying supply and demand or the
relative bargaining powers of the parties. Anticompetitive government
measures, by definition, affect deviations from the market prices that would
be determined by competitive conditions. These measures restrict the
purchasing options of consumers, granting interest groups the power to
artificially inflate prices beyond the level buyers and sellers on an equal
footing of bargaining power would have agreed to. Such measures, despite
their indirect nature, have clear distributive implications. Such implications
are essentially no different from those of measures that directly take
consumers’ money and allocate them to interest groups.
Correspondingly, the diminution of the value of money in terms of
purchasing power is conceptually equivalent to the expropriation of money.
That is because the money held by citizens is essentially a carrier of
purchasing power. For example, if a citizen possesses $100, there is no
difference between directly taking $20 away from them or creating an
uncompetitive market that inflates the price tag of products such that $100
would allow them to purchase no more in quantity and quality of goods than
$80 could purchase beforehand. Money, in contrast with other types of
43

This argument may be raised only with regards to anticompetitive government measures that do
not directly set prices.
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possessions, carries no independent value to its owners that cannot be
reduced to its exchange value—the value of goods and services it could be
exchanged for in the market. Therefore, if physical taking of money is an
infringement of property, so is the diminution of its value in terms of
purchasing power by artificially inflated prices.
The contention that the right to property in money includes the
protection of its value could be found in comparative constitutional law. For
example, Hans-Jürgen Papier, a former President of the German Federal
Constitutional Court, argued in 1973 that the guarantee of property found
in Article 14 of the German Basic Law includes the protection of the value
of money against changes in monetary policy, precisely because money is
essentially a carrier of purchasing power.44 This wide-ranging argument was
later rejected by the German Constitutional Court, given the impossibility of
requiring the state to guarantee the value of money against the numerous
factors that shape it.45 However, that decision is regarded as compatible with
the view that the protection of property under the German Constitution
extends to the state’s responsibility to guarantee the value of money by, interalia, maintaining a ‘functioning monetary order’ and institutionalizing the
independence of the central bank, as well as its mandate to ensure price
stability.46 To be sure, the question of whether monetary phenomena such
as inflation or currency devaluation could be seen as infringements of
property rights is beyond the scope and purpose of this Article, which focuses
on the effect of anticompetitive government measures on the property rights
of the diffuse public.
This understanding of the relationship between anticompetitive prices
and diminution of property value could also be found in U.S. jurisprudence.
In the case of Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., the Supreme Court found that “[a]
consumer whose money has been diminished by reason of an antitrust
violation has been injured ‘in his . . . property’ within the meaning of § 4 [of

44
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Hans-Jürgen Papier, Eigentumsgarantie und Geldentwertung, 98 ARCHIV DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS
528, 530 (1973) (arguing that the constitutional protection of property must take into account the
social and economic function of money as the carrier of purchasing power, which is of central
relevance for individual development. Hence, the value of money must be included in the scope of
the protection of property found in Article 14 of the German Basic Law).
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 31, 1998,
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 97, 350 (Ger.).; Isabel
Feichtner, Public Law’s Rationalization of the Legal Architecture of Money: What Might Legal Analysis of Money
Become?, 17 GERMAN L.J. 875, 886–87 (2016) (finding that the value of money cannot be guaranteed
by the state due to its dependency on multiple factors such as prices, wages, and interest rates).
Feichtner, supra note 45, at 887.
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the Clayton Act],”47 which provides that persons injured in their “business
or property” by anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue for treble
damages.48 The Court found that a consumer acquiring goods or services
for personal use “is injured in ‘property’ when the price of those goods or
services is artificially inflated by reason of the anticompetitive conduct
complained of.”49 While the Reiter decision recognizes injuries to property
due to inflated prices caused by private competition restraints, there is no
reason why the same should not hold true in the case of public competition
restraints.
B. Constitutional Protection of Property as a Response to Purely Private Wealth
Transfers Effected by the Systemic Failures of the Political Process
So far, this Article has established that anticompetitive government
measures could be seen as effecting government-imposed wealth transfers
that diminish the property of diffuse citizens. However, it does not simply
follow from this conception that such measures should be considered
potentially unconstitutional.
After all, many evidently permissible
government measures have profound redistributive implications. For
example, government may progressively or regressively levy taxes and
redistribute resources through spending, it may adopt zoning ordinances or
generate public projects that affect the market value of private property, and
it may enact labor and consumer protection laws that redistributes wealth by
modifying the relative bargaining powers of private parties.50 While the
Court recognized that government measures indirectly diminishing the value
of private property may sometimes be considered compensable takings,51 the
‘regulatory takings’ doctrine is very limited in its application.52 As the
Supreme Court explained when discussing the limits of mandating
compensation for regulatory takings, “[g]overnment hardly could go on if to
47
48
49
50
51

52

Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979).
15 U.S.C. § 15 (2017).
Reiter, 442 U.S. at 339.
See infra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“[I]f a regulation goes too far, it will
be recognized as a taking”). The Supreme Court developed the doctrine of regulatory takings
further in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 178–79 (1979); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717 (1987); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); and Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538–42 (2005).
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (declining to set a bright-line test of when regulation diminishing private
property goes “too far” but determining that compensation is due for the very limited category of
regulations that deny property owners “all economically beneficial or productive use of land”).
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some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without
paying for every such change in the general law.”53
This Section argues that, in contrast with other government measures
that effect wealth transfers, anticompetitive measures are worthy of rigorous
judicial scrutiny due to their propensity to violate a normative principle at
the heart of the constitutional protection of private property—namely, that
government actions that transfer wealth between persons in society ought to
promote, or be aimed to promote, a public purpose rather than purely
private ends. As will be explained, anticompetitive measures are prone to
violate this principle because the property interests of the diffuse majority are
susceptible to be harmed by a systemic failure of the political decision-making
process—the interest-group capture failure.
The constitutional protection of private property is arguably designed to
uphold two important normative limitations constraining the legitimate use
of government power to enrich some at the expense of others. First, in the
event that a government measure pursuing a public purpose diminishes
private property, the Takings Clause may require government to
compensate the aggrieved parties such that the burdens of the public
measure be “borne by the public as a whole” rather than by “some people
alone.”54 Second, and important for this analysis, the Takings Clause is
aimed to bar government from effecting purely private wealth transfers,
requiring the confiscating or diminishing measure to be aimed at pursuing
public rather than purely private ends.55 According to Cass Sunstein, a
central theme of the Constitution, and the Takings Clause in particular, is
the prohibition of what he terms “naked preferences”—the use of
government power to distribute resources to a certain group solely due to the
group’s capability of exercising “raw political power.”56 As Sunstein writes
with regards to the Takings Clause:
A principal theme of the eminent domain clause cases is that government
action cannot be used to serve purely private ends. Taking property from A
in order to benefit B is the core example. The text of the clause attests to

53
54
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Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413.
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
The prohibition of purely private wealth transfers is found in the ‘public use’ requirement of the
Takings Clause: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
U.S. CONST. amend. V. Accordingly, the Supreme Court repeatedly held that “one person’s
property may not be taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifying public
purpose, even though compensation be paid.” Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Corp., 300 U.S.
55, 80 (1937).
Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, supra note 10, at 1689.
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this theme in the basic requirement that a ‘public use’ be shown before a
taking is permitted, even with compensation. The function of this
requirement is to prevent purely private wealth transfers.57

This Article contends that anticompetitive government measures are
especially prone to reflect the “naked preferences” of special-interest groups
that are able to exercise their superior political influence to obtain the
measures, allowing them to reap monopoly profits at the expense of the
diffuse public. Due to their collective action problem, members of the diffuse
public are incapable of exerting countervailing political influence, or even
becoming aware of the measures and their distributive implications. In light
of that, anticompetitive measures are suspect of effecting wealth transfers that
are aimed to serve the private ends of favored interest groups rather than
their purported public ends. Rigorous scrutiny of anticompetitive measures
under the constitutional protection of property is therefore warranted, as the
diffuse public’s property interest in the purchasing power of their disposable
income is especially susceptible to injury by the systemic capture failures of
the public decision-making process. Part III outlines the contours of a
judicial test that could be used to scrutinize anticompetitive government
measures under this framework. Due to the impracticality and arguable
undesirability of substantive judicial review of the measures’ purported
public purposes, the proposed test focuses on scrutinizing the process that led
to their adoption as well as the government’s choice of means.
This argument in favor of rigorous judicial scrutiny of anticompetitive
government measures relies on the contention that the private property
interests that require judicially enforced constitutional protection are those
most susceptible to be taken by purely private wealth transfers produced by
the systemic failures of the public decision-making process. The remainder
of this Part aims to show that this contention is nothing new. It argues that
the constitutional protection of private property was originally designed to
respond to systemic failures of the political market.
When James Madison, who initially proposed the Takings Clause, called
for the constitutional protection of property and distinguished the types of
property interests that warrant heightened constitutional protection, he was
arguably motivated by the need to preempt private wealth transfers which
he believed would be produced by another type of political market failure—
namely, the tyranny of the majority.58 The opposite and no less pernicious

57
58

Id. at 1724.
See infra notes 61–67 and accompanying text.
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political failure—what may be termed the tyranny of the minority—was
apparently not as visible at that moment.
Madison’s concern with government infringement on private property
was tied to his concern with the dangers of partial, self-interested legislation,
aimed to favor one interest at the expense of others. Madison’s republican
ideal of a government pursuing the public good and refraining from partiality
to one interest or the other,59 ostensibly guided his thought on the relation
between government action and private property. According to Jennifer
Nedelsky, Madison believed that “[t]ax policies and economic regulation
might have some redistributive consequences, but it should not be their
objective to benefit some at the expense of others. That was the sort of partial
self-interested legislation to be avoided.”60 Recognizing that division into
different “sects, factions and interests” is a feature of civilized society,
Madison was weary of such “unjust laws,” cautioning that under democratic
forms of government “[d]ebtors have defrauded their creditors. The landed
interest has borne hard on the mercantile interest. The [h]olders of one
species of property have thrown a disproportion of taxes on the holders of
another species.”61
As his words suggest, Madison’s perception of the dangers of partial and
interested public action affecting private property were not limited only to
physical dispossession of physical property. Madison’s political philosophy
exhibited a much broader conception of private property which also
acknowledged indirect diminutions of value as violations of property rights.
For example, in 1786, he argued that paper money “[a]ffects rights of
property as much as taking away equal value in land; [and] affects property
without trial by [j]ury.”62 As Nedelsky writes:
Madison did not . . . have a simple conception of property as land or
even material goods. The ‘faculties of acquiring property’ [the protection of
which was, according to Federalist Ten, the first object of government]
emphasized a subtle, nonmaterial dimension of property. And the legislative
injustice he feared was not straightforward confiscation, but the more
indirect infringements inherent in paper money and debtor relief law. Those

59
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See NEDELSKY, supra note 1, at 42–43 (discussing Madison’s view that the government could
accomplish its supreme objective of promoting the public good only if it refrained from being partial
to any specific group’s interest).
Id. at 31.
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 3, at 135–36.
James Madison, Speech in the Virginia House of Delegates: Against Paper Money (Nov. 1786), in
2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 279, 280 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).
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interferences . . . were both more likely and more invidious because they
were less overt violations of property. 63

Furthermore, as Michael Treanor demonstrates, Madison viewed the
constitutional protection of private property as serving a hortatory function,
expressing a principle broader than the application of its legal protection,
which he believed government ought to adhere to—namely, that
government should abstain from “unjustly” burdening private economic
interests, even indirectly.64
However, when Madison set out to include the protection against
uncompensated government takings of private property in the Constitution,
he ostensibly intended to limit its application only to physical dispossession
of physical property interests, and not to indirect diminution, by government
regulation and taxation, of numerous other economic interests of private
parties.65 An important question could therefore be raised: If Madison’s
perception of the dangers of interested government infringements on private
property was so broad, why did he choose to constitutionally protect only
physical property interests against physical dispossessions?
The answer could arguably be found in Madison’s concerns relating to a
particular failure of the political process—namely, the majoritarian failure.
According to Treanor, Madison’s writings and speeches indicate that “he
believed that physical property needed greater protection than other forms
of property because its owners were peculiarly vulnerable to majoritarian
decisionmaking [sic.].”66 Madison held that, in general, the procedural and
institutional checks and balances provided by federalism were adequate to
protect most property interests.67 For instance he wrote that:
A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of
property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to
pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the
same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county
or district, than an entire State.68

However, according to Treanor, Madison held that physical property
interests required more than the procedural and structural protection that
63
64

65
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67
68

NEDELSKY, supra note 1, at 30.
See William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 782, 819, 840 (1995) (noting that Madison interpreted the Takings Clause to stand
for the broad principle that the government should refrain taking any action that directly or
indirectly diminished the value of private property).
Id. at 791–97.
Id. at 847.
Id. at 841–43.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
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sufficed to mitigate the threats of government infringements on other forms
of property. Landed interests required heightened substantive protection
against infringement because of a majoritarian failure in the political process.
Holding that “[i]n all cases where a majority are united by a common interest
or passion, the rights of the minority are in danger,”69 Madison believed that
universal suffrage and demographic growth will favor the interests of
manufacturers over the interests of landowners in majoritarian decisionmaking.70 As he wrote:
The three principal classes into which our citizens were divisible were the
landed, the commercial, and the manufacturing . . . It is particularly requisite
therefore that the interests of one or two of them should not be left entirely
to the care, or the impartiality of the third. 71

Emphasis on protection against physical takings may also be aligned with
the counter-majoritarian conception of constitutional protection in another
important way. Single government measures that physically take property
tend to affect specific individuals such as those who happen to own particular
plots of land, while indirect infringements by regulation and macroeconomic policy tend to affect much larger groups. Thus, Madison may have
held that the latter type of takings does not warrant a constitutional remedy,
as he assumed that large groups would be sufficiently capable of protecting
themselves against such takings through the regular mechanisms of
representative government.
More generally, it could be argued that protecting the minority of
landowners from the landless masses was the underlying concern of the
Framers of the U.S. Constitution. The installation of a complex and
diversified system of government, supermajority amendment requirements,
and a judicial review mechanism to protect constitutional rights responded
to concerns that a landless majority would use its numerical superiority to
redistribute property.72 Many contemporary legal scholars view the same
majoritarian failure as the primary source of justification for judicial review.73
Madison’s decision to grant landed individual interests special
constitutional protection was thus ostensibly guided by a criterion focused on
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THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 3, at 135.
Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, supra note 10, at 1691; Treanor, supra note 64, at 850.
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 3, at 124.
See Madison, supra note 68 (discussing the political structures designed to curb such conflict of
interests); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ch. 6 (1980).
See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (conceptualizing the Court as a countermajoritarian institution,
and hence seeking justification for judicial intervention against the wishes of the majority).
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political process failure. Madison believed that the primary defect of
republican government is the majoritarian failure, and that landed and
physical interests are particularly susceptible to be injured by it. He therefore
held that these property interests ought to be protected by an institution that
is insulated from the majoritarian failures—namely, judicially enforced
constitutional property rights. He presumed that the broad public whose
property interests could be affected indirectly by government measures was
capable of effectively securing its interests through the system of
representative government and the structural protections of federalism.
However, Madison apparently did not anticipate the severe systemic
failure of interest-group capture, that enables interest groups to shape public
policy that benefits their commercial interests to the detriment of the broad
unorganized public.74 Interestingly, Madison seems to have become more
aware of this failure at a later period, in light of developments related to
Alexander Hamilton’s economic plans in the 1790s. According to Nedelsky,
At the time of the convention, Madison devoted almost no attention to the
potential threat of the wealthy using their power to promote their own unjust
plans. . . . He thought Hamilton’s plans for redemption of public securities
would unjustly favor wealthy speculators. And he not only opposed
Hamilton’s plan for the bank as unconstitutional, he was appalled at the
spectacle of men within the government deriving personal gain from
governmental measures, and the wealthy successfully exerting pressure from
without.75

Accordingly, we argue that in light of the political market-failure of
interest-group capture, the property interests of the diffuse citizens are no less
susceptible to injury by interested public decisions than the property interests
of the minority of landowners are susceptible to injury by majoritarian public
decisions. Therefore, both types of property interests require the protection
of constitutional property rights enforced by courts, which are not only
insulated from the majoritarian failure, but are also insulated from interestgroup influence to a greater extent than the political branches of
government. As Richard Posner noted, judges are better shielded from the
pressures of special interests, as they have life tenure, fixed salaries, and
procedural rules that limit their contact with interest groups.76

74

75
76

See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 269 (1994) (describing the ability of smaller interest groups to
influence public policy such that it benefits their commercial interests to the detriment of the public
as ‘minoritarian bias’).
NEDELSKY, supra note 1, at 44.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 501 (9th ed. 2014).
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Anticompetitive government measures therefore ought to be conceived
as potentially unconstitutional takings of diffuse citizens’ private property, as
they may be aimed to effect purely private wealth transfers rather than to
promote public ends. Part III outlines a judicial test that could be used to
scrutinize and possibly invalidate anticompetitive government measures if
they are not justified as necessary to promoting their purported public
purposes.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEST FOR PROTECTING THE MAJORITY’S
PROPERTY AGAINST ANTICOMPETITIVE GOVERNMENT MEASURES
This Part outlines a framework for constitutional protection against
purely private wealth transfers effected by anticompetitive government
measures and discusses its practical desirability.
It suggests that
anticompetitive measures should be invalidated if special-interest influence
could be found to be involved in their adoption, and if they are not necessary
to promote their purported public purpose. Accordingly, this Part presents
a test for judicial scrutiny of suspect anti-competitive government measures.
As established above, anticompetitive government measures are
particularly suspect of being aimed at serving the private interests of specialinterest groups rather than a legitimate public purpose, due to a systemic
failure of the political decision-making process. They should therefore be
scrutinized by the courts under the ‘public use’ requirement of the Takings
Clause. To explain how the proposed test was selected, this Part starts by
discussing some straightforward alternatives.
At first glance, it may be argued that establishing the influence of an
interest group on the adoption of an anticompetitive measure should suffice
in and of itself to conclude that the measure in question fails to meet the
public use requirement. The fact of such influence arguably suggests that the
measure is aimed to promote the ends of the private parties who lobbied for
it rather than its purported public ends. However, in order to discern when
such measures should be seen as serving purely private ends, it is not enough
to examine whether they were produced by the favored group’s political
influence. Rather, it is necessary to turn to normative standards that
determine what purposes, and what conditions, may justify the distributive
effects of the measure. Einer Elhauge, in his criticism of the use of interest
group theory to justify more intrusive judicial review,77 rightly argues that we
77

See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31,
48–49 (1991) (arguing that interest group theory can be misleading without an identifiable implicit
normative baseline).
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cannot distinguish between proper and improper interest-group influence
without an independent normative baseline. For example, Elhauge
demonstrates that normative standards of social desirability are required in
order to judge the legitimacy of the political influence of a racial minority
seeking to obtain affirmative action policy which will favor its members at
the expense of the members of the diffuse racial majority.78 Without a
normative baseline, we cannot explain why some would view such political
influence as legitimate while judging the influence of a wealthy minority
seeking to prevent distributive public policy as illegitimate. Therefore, the
fact of special-interest influence on the adoption of a measure can only serve
to justify a heightened level of scrutiny of the measure’s purported purpose,
but not to render the measure unjustified as such.
If so, to judge the permissibility of a particular anticompetitive measure
under the public use requirement, we need to substantively examine whether
it serves a public purpose. One way to do so is to ask whether the expected
benefits of the measure outweigh its harm to the diffuse public’s private
property. Such a comparison of costs and benefits was suggested by Frank
Michelman’s economic analysis of the public use requirement.79 According
to Michelman, if the measure’s benefits exceed its costs, including the costs
of a hypothetical compensation scheme that would make the aggrieved
parties indifferent to their loss, a court could determine that the measure
meets the public use requirement. If the costs exceed the benefits, however,
a court could determine that the measure does not pursue a public purpose.80
However, such a judicial test of public use is arguably impractical and
undesirable. First, we may cast doubt on the competency of courts to
measure the costs and benefits associated with anticompetitive government
measures. Quantifying the loss incurred by consumers along with the
efficiency losses associated with anticompetitive measures and weighing them
against expected benefits, which may be intangible and speculative, would
require broad economic policy analysis, an expertise that judges may not
possess. More importantly, such a comparison requires value judgments as
to the worth of the measure’s purported benefits and the permissibility of
imposing any certain amount of loss on private parties for the sake of their
attainment. These judgments must invoke and apply a conception of the
78
79
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Id. at 51–53.
See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just
Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1194 (1967) (discussing the feasibility of a using a
balancing test to evaluate anticompetitive measures).
Id. at 1195.
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legitimate functions and ends of government, a task that today’s courts are
reluctant to undertake.81
Indeed, since the demise of the Lochner82 Era and its interpretation of
“substantive due process,”83 a time when economic regulations, including
minimum wage and child labor laws, were struck down as unconstitutional,
the Supreme Court stressed that it does not “sit as a superlegislature to weigh
the wisdom of legislation,”84 and held that legislative bodies should “have
broad scope to experiment with economic problems.”85 The prevailing
democratic theory holds that legislatures are the appropriate institution for
the definition of the appropriate ends of government, and in the context of
takings today’s courts are “exceedingly deferential to legislative definitions of
a permissible public use.”86 As Justice Douglas held in the case of Berman v.
Parker: “Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has
spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh
conclusive.”87
Interestingly, it could be argued that the ghost of Lochner is part of the
reason why the problem of anticompetitive government measures remains
unaddressed by courts until this day. The Parker decision that introduced the
antitrust “state action doctrine” was a child of the post-Lochner and New Deal
era, which exhibited greater judicial deference to state regulation. Some
have suggested that the doctrine “can be seen as a necessary concession to
anticompetitive state regulation to avoid a return to the Lochner era.”88 Since
then, lawyers such as Merrick Garland, now Chief Judge of the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, argued against the use of interest group
theory to justify judicial scrutiny of anticompetitive economic regulation
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Thomas W. Merrill, Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 66–68 (1986).
The period known in American legal history as the ‘Lochner Era’ is named after the case of Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934) (upholding a New York statute controlling the
price of milk); see also W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937) (upholding a Washington
statute establishing a minimum wage for women).
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
Merrill, supra note 81, at 63. For a recent example of the deferential interpretation of the public
use requirement, see Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005) (deferring to the city’s
judgment about the need for the program in question).
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Panel III: Antitrust and the Obama Administration: U.S.
Convergence with International Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition, 90 B.U.
L. REV. 1555, 1570 (2010).
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under federal antitrust law, asserting that this would amount to a dangerous
return to Lochnerism.89
In light of, and in accord with, the prevailing deference of today’s courts
to legislative determinations of permissible government ends, an alternative,
and arguably more appropriate, framework that would allow judicial
scrutiny of anticompetitive and arguably unconstitutional anticompetitive
government measures under the Takings Clause must be found. It is possible
to formulate such a judicial test, one that takes the permissibility of a
measure’s purported public purpose as given but does not abstain from
ascertaining whether it is aimed to advance private rather than public ends.
This Part draws upon Thomas Merrill’s suggestion that the public use
requirement could be reinterpreted to allow courts to scrutinize
government’s choice of means rather than the permissibility of the taking’s
ends.90 Such a task is arguably more accurate and better suited to the
institutional competency of courts, and hence more desirable under the
prevalent theory of democratic governance.
The proposed judicial test for the review of anticompetitive government
measures includes two prongs. First, the court should scrutinize the decisionmaking process to determine whether the adoption of the anticompetitive
measure was influenced by special interests that stand to benefit from it. The
court may consider evidence for the involvement of interest groups in the
process, as well as their relationships with decision-makers who took part in
it. Evidence that decision-makers considered the anticompetitive effects of
the measure, and the transparency of the process, may also be given weight
by the reviewing court. Second, the court should scrutinize the choice of
means available to the government. If the purported public purpose of the
anticompetitive measure could be achieved by a less harmful means to the
affected public, it could be concluded, even without clear and direct
evidence, that the measure’s real aim was to effect a private wealth transfer
in violation of the public use requirement. Indeed, even if unintentional, an
unnecessary transfer of wealth from some citizens to others should not be
permitted by the Constitution.
Invalidating anticompetitive government measures on the basis of the
proposed test is justified by the contention that if a less harmful means was
available to achieve the same purported purpose of the measure, and if the
decision-making process that led to the adoption of the measure was tainted
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with the political influence of the benefitted party, the reasonable
presumption is that the government measure transfers wealth from the
diffuse public to the benefited party for the sake of the latter’s purely private
ends. Invalidation is the appropriate remedy for the elimination of those
unjustified wealth transfers, as affording compensation to the members of the
diffuse public is both impractical and undesirable—following a scheme of
compensation, the diffuse public will nevertheless end up paying for the
monopoly profits of the benefited interest group through their tax dollars.
The rigorous level of scrutiny is justified by the concern that due to the
systemic failure of the political process, anticompetitive measures are likely
to reflect the ‘naked preferences’ of interest groups while purporting to
promote legitimate public purposes. As Sunstein argued, “[h]eightened
scrutiny is triggered by a concern that in the circumstances it is especially
likely that the measure under review reflects a naked preference,”91 and is
justified by the perception that the groups infringed upon “lack the political
power to protect themselves against factional tyranny.”92 As Sunstein points
out, the court may review “government claims that a public value is being
served,”93 inter-alia by searching for less restrictive alternatives in which
government could have promoted the public value, seeing that the
“availability of such alternatives . . . suggests that the public value justification
is a facade.”94
This proposed judicial test is not only pertinent but also practical. The
task of deciding whether government measures have an anticompetitive
effect is clearly within the capacity of courts, as they are routinely tasked with
such analysis in the context of antitrust law; deciding whether an interest
group was behind a particular anticompetitive measure is also within the
reach of courts, as demonstrated in several judgments that reflected no
hesitation to identify such influences;95 and courts are experienced with
determining whether government employed the least restrictive means in
91
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See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 115–16 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
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various constitutional contexts.96 As Krier and Sterk have shown,97 in
adjudicating takings cases, state courts scrutinize the political processes that
had generated government regulation and are likely to find takings in cases
in which the government actors responsible for harm to landowners are least
likely to be politically accountable.
The feasibility of implementing this proposal can also be demonstrated
by numerous incidents where the FTC intervened in the process of
regulation by advocating against anticompetitive government measures that
would unnecessarily inflict economic harms on the diffuse public.98 These
interventions show that it is possible to objectively identify anticompetitive
measures and to ascertain whether less restrictive means are available to
achieve their purported public goals. For example, the FTC warned several
state legislatures against promulgating certain statutory exemptions to
antitrust laws that would have allowed physicians to collectively bargain with
managed health plans.99 Drawing on evidence from similar cases, the FTC
concluded that such exemptions would lead to an anticompetitive outcome,
increasing costs and limiting consumer access to care, and argued that the
measure is not likely to achieve its purported public purpose of improving
the quality of care, which according to their analysis “can be accomplished
through less anticompetitive means.”100 In another instance, the FTC
convinced the Governor of New York to veto a so-called “sale below cost”
bill that would have prohibited crude oil producers and refiners from selling
motor fuels below refiner costs, thereby restraining competition between
these suppliers, and possibly harming consumers without providing a
countervailing benefit.101 The FTC’s comments argued that the public
purpose of the measure, which was actually to protect competition, could be
achieved by less anticompetitive means through existing federal antitrust
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law.102 The FTC’s intervention in these and other cases shows that it is
possible to objectively demonstrate the existence of the elements of the
proposed test.103
A possible objection that can be raised against this proposal is that the
judicial review of anticompetitive measures may suffer from the very same
failure that inheres in the political system. Although the judiciary is the
branch of government least susceptible to interest-group influence, it is not
clear that the diffuse group of citizens is more capable of overcoming its
collective action problem in courts than it is in the public political process.
One could argue that challenges to anticompetitive government measures
would rarely make it to courts. That is because such measures would remain
below the radar of the harmed individuals or because challenging such
measures would require some sacrifice by some of the harmed individuals
whereas the benefit would spread to the entire diffuse group of consumers at
a low reward per capita. That would make it irrational for individual
members of the group to bear the costs of litigation.
Indeed, the collective action problem inherent in the costs of litigating
such cases calls for attention. However, relatively speaking, courts pose to
diffuse plaintiffs much simpler barriers to collective action than does the
political process. Crowdfunding104 and class actions105 could be successfully
used to facilitate overcoming these barriers. Besides that, the effects of the
availability of the proposed framework of judicial review goes beyond the
particular challenges to anticompetitive measures that could be brought
under it. The remedy of ex-post invalidation of anticompetitive government
measures is aimed to preempt this type of interested wealth transfers and to
mitigate the capture failure ex-ante. The availability of judicial review that
could invalidate such measures should impel decision-makers to conduct
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more inclusive and transparent decision-making processes, to give weight to
the interests of the diffuse public in competitive prices, and to reduce the
involvement of special-interest groups in the shaping of public policy that
affects the diffuse public. The requirement that the decision-making process
take competition into account should give the federal antitrust agencies more
tools to challenge anticompetitive decisions before they are adopted and
should produce more public information that could assist the diffuse citizens
in overcoming their collective action problem and empowering them to
influence public decisions through the political process.
CONCLUSION
This Article argued that takings jurisprudence must extend the Takings
Clause to apply to the protection of the diffuse majority of citizens against
regulations that transfer wealth to special-interest groups who manage to
obtain anticompetitive government measures. The point of departure was
the observation that the political system is prone to systemically produce
purely private wealth transfers from the diffuse majority to concentrated
interest groups due to the disparity of political power between the parties.
Due to this systemic failure, it is justified—and consistent with the original
intent of the Framers—to afford heightened constitutional protection to the
property interests of the diffuse public. Conceptualizing the purchasing
power of citizens’ disposable income as constitutionally protected property,
could safeguard it against regulatory measures that cater to special interests.
One may ask why this proposition has not emerged before. Surely, this
cannot be attributed solely to the rigidity of the takings doctrine. After all,
while the Takings Clause was originally intended and interpreted to apply
only to physical dispossession, the concept of ‘regulatory takings’ has
ultimately been recognized in the jurisprudence.106 Additionally, property
rights were invoked in political resistance to environmental regulations that
restricted land use and indirectly decreased property value.107 Despite all
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these, the concept of ‘regulatory taking’ as a ‘taking’ was never extended
beyond the protection of certain politically savvy and influential sectors.
The constitutional void that this Article has identified in the
constitutional protection of the majority’s property could be explained by the
same collective action problem that precluded the diffuse public from
influencing government. Whereas heterogenic and relatively small groups of
actors have always been able to mobilize political power to protect their
property, the large and diffuse group of citizens that is harmed by
anticompetitive public policy could not overcome the collective action
problem in order to comprehend the source of its loss, let alone to name it
and to collectively demand protection against it under the law. This is
nothing new, of course. Property rights were always defined in the ‘political
market,’ where different groups possess varying degrees of influence, and not
only in the economic market.108 Historically, as Mancur Olson elaborates in
The Rise and Decline of Nations, because smaller groups could organize
themselves more quickly than their opponents within the nascent
Westphalian system of sovereign states, they were able to use the state as the
instrument for obtaining a disproportionate share of the domestic
resources.109
Perhaps more fundamentally, it might be the case that the same collective
action problem prevented the group of diffuse citizens from conceptualizing
their economic interests as rights entitled to constitutional protection. An
interesting contemporary analogy of failure to articulate entitlements can be
drawn from Eric Posner’s and Glen Weyl’s recent proposal to
reconceptualize data in the digital market as owned by the users rather than
by the social media and other companies that provide users services “for free”
while selling the data to third parties.110 So far the market remains at that
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equilibrium as consumers are not aware of the value of the data they are
producing and even if they are, they struggle to act in unison to demand their
share from the service providers. As in the case of consumer data,
reconceptualizing the claim to protecting competitive markets as supported
under the constitution can help members of diffuse groups to overcome the
problem of collective action and demand what is theirs.

